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VANASKIE, Circuit Judge. 
 Petitioner Emilio Fabian Moreno was ordered removed 
to his native country of Argentina after the Board of 
Immigration Appeals found that his conviction for possession 
of child pornography under 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 6312(d) 
constituted a crime involving moral turpitude (“CIMT”).  In 
his petition for review, Moreno argues that, under the 
categorical approach, the least culpable conduct hypothetically 
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necessary to sustain a conviction under § 6312(d) is not 
morally turpitudinous.  We disagree.  Pennsylvania’s 
community consensus, as gauged by case law and legislative 
enactments, condemns the least culpable conduct punishable 
under § 6312(d) as morally turpitudinous.  We therefore will 
deny Moreno’s petition for review.  
I. 
 Forty-nine-year-old petitioner Emilio Fabian Moreno, a 
native and citizen of Argentina, was admitted to the United 
States under a grant of humanitarian parole in May of 1980.1  
On August 4, 2015, Moreno pleaded guilty to one count of 
possession of child pornography under subsection (d) of 
Pennsylvania’s “Sexual abuse of children” statute, 18 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. § 6312.  The Philadelphia County Court of 
Common Pleas sentenced Moreno to five years of probation, 
ordered that he forfeit his computer, and required him to 
register as a sex offender.  Moreno does not challenge his 
conviction.  
 The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) 
initiated removal proceedings against Moreno on April 5, 
2016, charging him as removable for having been convicted of 
a crime involving moral turpitude under 8 U.S.C. § 
                                              
 1 Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A), “[t]he Attorney 
General may . . . in his discretion parole into the United States 
temporarily under such conditions as he may prescribe only on 
a case-by-case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or 
significant public benefit any alien applying for admission to 
the United States . . . .”  
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1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I).2  Moreno thereafter filed a Motion to 
Terminate Proceedings, challenging his removability on the 
ground that a conviction under § 6312(d) does not rise to the 
level of a CIMT.  The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied 
Moreno’s motion and ordered him removed to Argentina.   
 Moreno then filed an appeal with the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”).  In a single-member, 
unpublished, non-precedential decision, the BIA rejected 
Moreno’s contention that his conviction did not qualify as a 
CIMT.   This timely appeal followed. 
II. 
 The BIA had appellate jurisdiction to review the IJ’s 
order of removal pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b)(3).  We have 
jurisdiction to review Moreno’s legal and constitutional 
challenges under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1).   
Moreno’s petition presents two issues for our 
consideration: (1) whether his conviction for possession of 
child pornography under 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 6312(d) renders 
him removable as an alien convicted of a CIMT; and (2) 
whether the statutory provision deeming aliens convicted of a 
CIMT inadmissible, as set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 
                                              
 2 “[A]ny alien convicted of, or who admits having 
committed, or who admits committing acts which constitute 
the essential elements of--(I) a crime involving moral turpitude 
(other than a purely political offense) or an attempt or 
conspiracy to commit such a crime . . . is inadmissible.”  8 
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). 
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1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), is void for vagueness under the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.   
Where, as here, the BIA issues a written decision on the 
merits, “we review its decision, not that of the IJ.” Catwell v. 
Att’y Gen., 623 F.3d 199, 205 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Sheriff v. 
Att’y Gen., 587 F.3d 584, 588 (3d Cir. 2009)).  We exercise de 
novo review over the BIA’s determination that a conviction 
under 18 Pa Cons. Stat. § 6312(d) qualifies as a CIMT, Baptiste 
v. Att’y Gen., 841 F.3d 601, 606 (3d Cir. 2016), as well as 
Moreno’s due process challenge to the definition of CIMT, 
Abdulrahman v. Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 587, 595–96 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(citing Lee Moi Chong v. I.N.S., 264 F.3d 378, 386 (3d Cir. 
2001)).  And while we ordinarily accord deference to “the 
BIA’s determination that a certain crime involves moral 
turpitude,” Mehboob v. Att’y Gen., 549 F.3d 272, 275 (3d Cir. 
2008) (footnote omitted) (citing Knapik v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 
84, 88 (3d Cir. 2004)), such deference is not required where, as 
here, “we are asked to review an unpublished, non-precedential 
decision issued by a single BIA member.”  Mahn v. Att’y Gen., 
767 F.3d 170, 173 (3d Cir. 2014).  “At most,” the BIA’s 
decision is “persuasive authority.”  Id. (citing Skidmore v. Swift 
& Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)).   
III. 
A. 
 Under our precedent, we apply the categorical approach 
to determine whether moral turpitude inheres in a particular 
offense.  Partyka v. Att’y Gen., 417 F.3d 408, 411 (3d Cir. 
2005) (internal citations omitted).  Our inquiry proceeds in two 
steps.  First, we must “ascertain the least culpable conduct 
hypothetically necessary to sustain a conviction under the 
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statute.”  Jean-Louis v. Att’y Gen., 582 F.3d 462, 471 (3d Cir. 
2009) (citing Partyka, 417 F.3d at 411).  After making this 
determination, we must then ask whether the identified conduct 
is morally turpitudinous, i.e., whether it is “inherently base, 
vile, or depraved; contrary to the accepted rules of morality and 
the duties owed other persons, either individually or to society 
in general.”  Mehboob, 549 F.3d at 275 (citing Partyka, 417 
F.3d at 413).  If so, then a conviction under 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
§ 6312(d) qualifies as a CIMT.3   
                                              
 3 We pause here to echo the concerns recently expressed 
by several of our colleagues about the application of the 
categorical approach.  See, e.g., United States v. Lewis, No. 16-
4378, 2018 WL 317776, at *5 (3d Cir. Jan. 8, 2018) (Roth, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (emphasizing the incongruity of 
applying the categorical approach when the defendant has 
already admitted to the underlying facts in a guilty plea); 
United States v. Chapman, 866 F.3d 129, 136 (3d Cir. 2017) 
(Jordan, J., concurring in the judgment) (calling attention to “a 
consistently troubling feature” of the categorical approach, 
namely: “its requirement that judges ignore the real world”); 
Lewis, 2018 WL 317776, at *2 n.7 (majority opinion) 
(expressing agreement with Judge Roth’s view concerning the 
“lack of reality” entailed in applying the categorical approach); 
United States v. Oliver, No. 17-2747, slip op. at n.3 (March 27, 
2018) (noting the “lack of reality” associated with the 
categorical approach).  As applied in the immigration context, 
the categorical approach requires us to undertake an academic 
thought experiment that bears no relation to the factual premise 
for the petitioner’s underlying conviction.  Here, it is not 
disputed that the Petitioner possessed child pornography.  Yet, 
to quote Judge Jordan, we must nevertheless “ignore facts 
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 Moreno’s statute of conviction provides that a person is 
guilty of possessing child pornography if he or she 
“intentionally views or knowingly possesses or controls any 
book, magazine, pamphlet, slide, photograph, film, videotape, 
computer depiction or other material depicting a child under 
the age of 18 years engaging in a prohibited sexual act or in the 
simulation of such act . . . .”  18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 6312(d).  
Moreno argues that the least culpable conduct hypothetically 
necessary to sustain a conviction under § 6312(d) is consensual 
“sexting” between an eighteen-year-old and a seventeen-year-
old.4   
 A review of case law makes clear that an adult may 
indeed be convicted under § 6312(d) if found to be in 
possession of sexually explicit images of minor, even if the 
minor consents to the adult’s possession of the images.  See 
Commonwealth v. Kitchen, 814 A.2d 209, 211 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2002), aff’d, 839 A.2d 184 (Pa. 2003) (adult convicted under § 
6312(d) for possessing “sexually explicit photographs of his 
                                              
already known and proceed with eyes shut[,]” a course that 
requires us to theorize about hypothetical conduct that may or 
may not fall within the reach of the underlying statute at issue.  
Chapman, 866 F.3d at 138 (Jordan, J., concurring in the 
judgment).  The categorical approach’s disregard of the actual 
facts of a conviction fosters inconsonant results, and we would 
be remiss if we did not note our dismay at having to employ 
the categorical approach in this case.    
 
 4 Sexting is “the practice of sending or posting sexually 
suggestive text messages and images, including nude or semi-
nude photographs, via cellular telephones or over the Internet.”  
Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139, 143 (3d Cir. 2010).   
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sixteen-year-old paramour”).  And although we have not 
uncovered a Pennsylvania decision that addresses the precise 
scenario outlined above––i.e., where an eighteen-year-old is 
found to possess consensual, sexually explicit images of a 
seventeen-year-old––such exactitude is not required under our 
precedent; instead, we need only “ascertain the least culpable 
conduct hypothetically necessary to sustain a conviction” 
under § 6312(d).  Jean-Louis, 582 F.3d at 471 (internal citation 
omitted) (emphasis added).  To this end, it is sufficient that an 
eighteen-year-old, at the very least, faces the possibility of 
being charged under § 6312(d) for sexting with a minor.  See, 
e.g., Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139, 143 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(addressing threats made by a District Attorney to bring felony 
charges against high school students suspected of sexting).   
 Having identified the least culpable conduct necessary 
for conviction under § 6312(d), we must now assess whether 
such conduct qualifies as a CIMT under the INA.  Moreno 
contends that possession of child pornography under § 6312(d) 
cannot be regarded as a crime involving moral turpitude 
because society would not find sexting between an eighteen-
year-old and a seventeen-year-old to be morally reprehensible.  
A review of Pennsylvania case law and the Pennsylvania 
General Assembly’s legislative enactments, however, suggests 
otherwise.   
 The Pennsylvania legislature has long held that “the 
inexperience of youth prevent[s] . . . intelligent judgment in 
matters of morality.”  Commonwealth v. Collin, 335 A.2d 383, 
386 (Pa. 1975) (quoting Commonwealth v. Blauvelt, 140 A.2d 
463, 467 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1958)); see also Commonwealth v. 
Davidson, 938 A.2d 198, 215 (Pa. 2007) (“There clearly is a 
compelling state interest in the protection and safeguarding of 
minors.  The purpose of Section 6312 is plainly to protect 
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children, end the abuse and exploitation of children, and 
eradicate the production and supply of child pornography.”).  
Indeed, the court in Kitchen relied upon this “protective” 
principle in rendering its decision, ultimately concluding that 
the defendant’s “relationship with the victim . . .  [was] no 
excuse for his behavior.”  814 A.2d at 213–14.  There, the 
defendant was charged with possession of child pornography 
after taking “pornographic pictures” of his then-sixteen-year-
old girlfriend.  Id. at 211–13.  In upholding his conviction, the 
court observed that, under Pennsylvania law, “the consent of a 
child victimized by having pornographic pictures taken of 
him/her [was] . . . ‘of no moment.’”  Id. at 213 (quoting Collin, 
335 A.2d at 386).  “Clearly,” the court wrote, “no one can 
legally take pornographic photographs of a child, regardless of 
whether the child consents.”  Id.  
 The notion that Pennsylvania considers an adult’s act of 
sexting with a minor to be morally turpitudinous is reinforced 
by the General Assembly’s enactment of 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 
6321.  Passed in 2012, § 6321 downgraded the transmission 
and possession of “sexually explicit images” from a felony to 
a misdemeanor or summary offense if the crime is committed 
by a minor between the ages of twelve and seventeen.  Notably 
absent from the statute’s purview are eighteen-year-olds.  Had 
the legislature viewed an eighteen-year-old’s possession of 
sexually explicit images of a minor to be deserving of a lesser 
charge, it could have crafted the sexting statute accordingly.  
Yet, the legislature unequivocally excluded eighteen-year-olds 
from § 6321’s reach, opting instead to leave them within the 
felony-level ambit of § 6312.   
 What is clear from the foregoing analysis is that, in 
Pennsylvania, courts and legislators alike have taken a hard-
lined stance when it comes to safeguarding minor victims of 
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sexual abuse.  From this consensus, we conclude that, 
regardless of the circumstance, Pennsylvania’s accepted rules 
of morality are violated when an adult possesses sexually 
explicit images of a minor.  We therefore reject Moreno’s 
argument and conclude that the least culpable conduct 
hypothetically necessary to sustain a conviction under 18 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. § 6312(d) constitutes a CIMT pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I).  
B. 
 Moreno next argues that his conviction for possession 
of child pornography under 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 6312(d) cannot 
serve as the basis for his removal because the definition of 
CIMT is void for vagueness.  We disagree.   
 “The Due Process Clause precludes the government 
from taking away a person’s life, liberty, or property under a 
statute ‘so vague that it fails to give ordinary people fair notice 
of the conduct it punishes, or so standardless that it invites 
arbitrary enforcement.’”  Baptiste, 841 F.3d at 615 (quoting 
Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2556 (2015)).  
Because vagueness challenges are evaluated “on a case by case 
basis[,]” we must examine 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) to 
determine whether the statute “is vague as applied” to Moreno.  
San Filippo v. Bongiovanni, 961 F.2d 1125, 1136 (3d Cir. 
1992) (citing United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 550 
(1975)).  
 Our vagueness inquiry is guided by the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223 (1951).  
There, an alien twice convicted of fraud and tax evasion was 
subject to deportation pursuant to a predecessor version of the 
INA that authorized removal for “crimes involving moral 
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turpitude.”  Id. at 224–25.  Raising the constitutional issue of 
vagueness sua sponte, the Court held that the phrase “crime 
involving moral turpitude” was not void for vagueness because 
it complied with “[t]he essential purpose of the ‘void for 
vagueness’ doctrine[,]” i.e., it “warn[ed]” the defendant that, 
were he to commit a crime “in which fraud was an 
ingredient[,]” then the “statutory consequence” of his 
conviction would be deportation.  Id. at 229–32.  For the Court, 
“the adequacy of [the CIMT] standard” in the immigration 
context was strengthened by the “significant” fact that “the 
phrase ha[d] been part of the immigration laws for more than 
sixty years[,]” and no court had ever “[held] that the phrase 
[was] vague” or otherwise suggested that “the phrase [was] so 
meaningless as to be a deprivation of due process.”  Id. at 229–
30, 232.   
 The same rationale holds true today.  We have 
consistently defined a morally turpitudinous offense to be one 
“that is inherently base, vile, or depraved, contrary to the 
accepted rules of morality and the duties owed other persons, 
either individually or to society in general.”  Knapik, 384 F.3d 
at 89.  Applying this definition here, it is clear that “[w]hatever 
else the phrase ‘crime involving moral turpitude’ may mean in 
peripheral cases,” Jordan, 341 U.S. at 232, it is readily 
apparent that crimes involving possession of child 
pornography and sexual abuse of children are morally 
turpitudinous.  See, e.g., Totimeh v. Att’y Gen., 666 F.3d 109, 
116 (3d Cir. 2012) (“Sexual assault, child abuse, and spousal 
abuse are no doubt inherently vile and elicit strong outrage.”); 
United States v. Santacruz, 563 F.3d 894, 897 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(“We hold that knowing possession of child pornography is a 
crime involving moral turpitude.”).  Thus, like the Supreme 
Court in Jordan, we conclude “that Congress sufficiently 
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forewarned [the Petitioner] that the statutory consequence” of 
possessing child pornography is deportation.  341 U.S. at 232.   
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, Moreno’s petition for review 
is denied.  
